The Dissolution of the Matrimonial Property Regime and the Succession Rights of the Surviving Spouse by Álvarez Torné, Maria
Cornell Law Library
Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository
Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers Faculty Scholarship
12-21-2007
The Dissolution of the Matrimonial Property
Regime and the Succession Rights of the Surviving
Spouse
Maria Álvarez Torné
Visiting Scholar, Cornell Law School, ma492@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers
Part of the Conflicts of Law Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the Property Law and Real
Estate Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For
more information, please contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Álvarez Torné, Maria, "The Dissolution of the Matrimonial Property Regime and the Succession Rights of the Surviving Spouse"
(2007). Cornell Law Faculty Working Papers. Paper 27.
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clsops_papers/27
 1 
The dissolution of the matrimonial property regime and the  
succession rights of the surviving spouse 
 
 
MARIA ÁLVAREZ TORNÉ 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
These pages are addressed to examining the problems arising from the 
regulation of the dissolution of the matrimonial property regime on the death of 
one of the spouses in relation to the determination of the succession rights of 
the surviving spouse in Private International Law (from now on, PIL). I will 
specifically try to analyse the conciliation difficulties between what is stipulated 
in each relevant field after the death of one of the spouses. The surviving 
spouse’s situation often depends on the simultaneous effect of the matrimonial 
property regime and also of Succession Law. In fact, this study deals with a 
classical problem of PIL which has been subject to recent innovative 
interpretations and has acquired a new importance. 
My research also includes the treatment given to succession rights in cases of 
homosexual and heterosexual civil partnerships. It is mainly focussed on the 
German and the Spanish PIL systems, but I will also refer occasionaly to legal 
systems of other EU Member States.  
2. GENERAL PIL QUESTIONS 
Firstly when we are faced with a PIL case, the elements establishing 
international jurisdiction have to be examined, given that the adaptation 
difficulties referred to above, which are centred in the field of applicable law, 
appear as a result of the choice of law rules of the forum, and the determination 
of the competent judge always takes place first. In this sense, it is worth 
highlighting the absence of international conventions concerning international 
successions in the field of jurisdiction, except for some bilateral conventions and 
a nordic multilateral convention. The private international law of succession in 
each jurisdiction is essentialy based on national sources. Nevertheless, the 
“Hague Convention of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to 
the Estates of Deceased Persons” has been signed by a few countries and is not 
yet in force but already ratified by the Netherlands.1 
                                                 
1  With regard to the text of the Convention, see P. LAGARDE, La nouvelle Convention 
 de La Haye sur la loi applicable aux successions, Rev. Crit., 1989, pp. 249 ff. Concerning the 
 ratification of the Convention by the Netherlands, see A. BORRÁS, La ratificación por 
 Holanda del Convenio de La Haya de 1 de agosto de 1989 sobre ley aplicable a las 
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When a conflict of law system has different rules on succession and 
matrimonial property it may happen that different laws apply at the same time. 
This may result in allowing the widow or widower to obtain either more or less 
than would be available under each of the two national systems concerned. This 
means that the widow or widower can be economically advantaged if both 
statutes grant him or her succession rights. On the contrary, she or he will be 
unfairly neglected when each applied legal system provides that the widow or 
widower has no succession rights. An additional difficulty is that some legal 
systems, like the French one, adopt the principle of scission of the succession 
only in relation to the succession statute and not to the matrimonial property 
regime. This means that we could find a case of renvoi only regarding for 
example the succession to an immovable.  
 
We can start tackling the difficulty of this kind of international cases referring to 
a practical case commented by Droz in the Hague Conference Acts and Documents 
of the Twelfth Session:2 “A person dies domicilied in the Netherlands. Together 
with his or her Dutch goods, the decedent leaves a building in England, a bank 
account in France and a trunk in a Swiss bank. The Dutch court may have 
jurisdiction on the basis of the decedent’s domicile. Jurisdiction may be 
exercised regarding the entire succession, while an English judge probably has 
jurisdiction only concerning the liquidation of the English building. In France, a 
judge could take a decision because of the nationality of one of the parties…” 
The complexity of this example may increase if this decedent dies leaving a 
surviving spouse or partner, whose succession rights have to be determined, 
often by a judge who can choose between applying a conflict of laws rule on 
succession or a rule on matrimonial property. 
 
A European instrument unifying PIL rules on the law applicable to succession 
and wills is still not available, awaiting legislative development after the 
adoption of the Green Paper on Succession Law in 2005.3 In consequence, each 
autonomous PIL system handles the conciliation difficulties between the law 
applicable to the succession and the law applicable to the effects of marriage in 
its own way. Therefore, the national judge has to resolve the possibly 
incongruous results generated by the application of different laws to closely 
linked aspects in accordance with her or his own PIL system. 
 
                                                                                                                                               
 sucesiones por causa de muerte, Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, 1996, pp. 
 363 f. 
2  G. DROZ,  in Actes et Documents de la Douzième session, 1972, t. II, p. 16. 
3  Concerning the need for harmonization in the field of conflict of law of Succession in 
 the European Union, see the study written by DNotI/H. DÖRNER/P. LAGARDE, 
 Les Successions  Internationales dans l’UE: Perspectivas pour une Harmonisation, German 
 Notary Institute, Brussels, 2004.  
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3. DETERMINATION OF THE SUCCESSION RIGHTS OF THE WIDOWED 
 SPOUSE FROM A PIL PERSPECTIVE  
Historically we can see a trend in European substantive laws consisting of 
strengthening the succession rights of the surviving spouse, which of course 
involves a loss of succession rights of other family members, such as children..4 
In general, EU legal systems coincide in holding that in order to determine the 
precise amount of the decedent’s estate, it is necessary first to divide the 
matrimonial property of the spouses.5 However, it may happen that a certain 
PIL system applies different rules to the dissolution of the matrimonial 
property regime and the law governing succession, so that characterisation 
problems between the succession and the matrimonial property statute can 
arise because their regulation is not subjected to the same legal system. 
European PIL systems in general have no specific PIL rule clarifying 
unequivocally how to define the succession rights of the surviving spouse. 
Consequently, the ways of resolving this problem vary according to each 
particular legal system.  
For instance, the conflict of laws system in England differs from continental 
legal systems with respect to sources, and also regarding the fact that, when an 
English judge decides he has international jurisdiction, he will often apply 
domestic law.  In the field of the effects of marriage on property, rights obtained 
by the husband or the wife dealing with movable property are determined by 
the law of the matrimonial domicile, when there is no specific contract or 
settlement. It is not clear if this rule also applies to immovables, because 
although some decisions of the House of Lords adopt a unitary view appyling 
both to movables and immovables, other decisions consider that the latter 
depend on the lex situs. Changes in the matrimonial domicile, which is also a 
controversial concept, do not necessarily carry with them alterations in the 
matrimonial property regime. Coordination disadjustments between the 
matrimonial property law and the succession law will derive from this fact.6 As 
can also be noted in general in the continental PIL systems, a specific rule 
establishing the succession rights of the surviving spouse in intestate succession 
does not exist in English PIL, and the need to reconcile the protection granted as 
a result of the dissolution of the matrimonial property regime and that 
conferred by the law of succession is also subject to debate. In legal literature, it 
is difficult to give a satisfactory answer to this problem given the current 
configuration of the English rules of the conflict of laws. It has been suggested 
in this sense that the law of succession in the field of substantive law (as distinct 
                                                 
4  W. PINTENS, Europäisierung des Erbrechts, ZEuP 2001, pp. 632 f. 
5  K. H. NEUMAYER, “The surviving spouse” in K. H. NEUMAYER (ed), International 
 Encyclopedia of Comparative Law, Volume V Succession, co-published by Mohr Siebeck, 
 Tübingen, and Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster, 2002, p. 45.  
6  A. V. DICEY/J. H. C. MORRIS/L. COLLINS, The conflict of laws, Sweet & Maxwell, 
 London, 2006, p. 1299.  
 4 
from the rules of conflict of laws) should be changed to subject the succession 
rights of the widowed spouse to the matrimonial property law.7    
3.1. THE PARTICULAR CASE OF THE SPANISH PIL SOLUTION: THE PROS 
 AND CONS 
3.1.1. The formulation of article 9.8 of the Spanish Civil Code 
In Spanish PIL there are different conflict of laws rules on succession and the 
matrimonial property regime. It should also be recalled that Spanish private 
law is not unified and that we therefore have many conflict situations in cases 
where there is no international element. Article 9.8 of the Spanish Civil Code 
(CC) applies to both international and internal situations. The final sentence of 
the conflict of laws rule contained in article 9.8 CC,8 which contains the conflict 
of laws rule on succession, seeks however to avoid the problem of reconciling 
the law applicable to matrimonial property and the law applicable to the 
succession rights of the surviving spouse. This involves, as we have seen, an 
important exception to the general outlook of the European PIL systems. Article 
9.8 CC provides that the succession claim of the surviving spouse is governed 
by the law applicable to the effects of the marriage under article 9.2 CC, unless 
there has been a will, not including the legally reserved portions of the 
descendants. Contractual or testate succession will not be governed by this 
remission of article 9.8, but rather by the testator’s national law or the 
disponent’s national law at the moment of the grant.  
This final section of article 9.8 CC was introduced by Law 11/1990 of 15 
October, which modified some articles of the Spanish Civil Code. It is a 
conflictual solution, instead of working on the substantive laws in question by 
way of adaptation. This solution seeks to be a preventive mechanism, rather 
than a corrective one.9 This article has chosen the so-called formula of “indirect 
adaptation”. For a long time, Spanish legal literature has criticized this 
adaptation model, insofar as it operates without taking into account if it is really 
necessary or not. As result of this point of view, this sector of Spanish legal 
                                                 
7  A. V. DICEY/J. H. C. MORRIS/L.  COLLINS, The conflict of laws,  Sweet & Maxwell, 
 London, 2006, p. 1300.  
8  Article 9.8 Spanish Civil Code determines: Succession by reason of death will be governed by 
the national law of the deceased at the moment of his death, whatever the nature of the  property 
and whichever country it is in. However, dispositions in the will and successory agreements 
which are in accordance with the national law of the testator or of the disponent at the moment of 
their being executed will conserve their validity, although another law may govern the 
succession, and any legally reserved portions will be in accordance with the latter. The rights 
that by law are attributed to the surviving spouse will be governed by the same law that 
regulates the effects of the marriage, save in respect of the legally reserved portions of the 
descendants. 
9 M. E. ZABALO ESCUDERO, La situación jurídica del cónyuge viudo: Estudio en el Derecho 
 internacional privado y Derecho interregional, Aranzadi, Pamplona,  1993, p. 107. 
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literature prefers the technique of direct adaptation, which works on the 
correction of the material rules when an effective disadjustment is confirmed.10 
Before the modification of Law 11/1990 of 15 October was introduced, the 
Spanish courts resolved the cases we are examining without unified criteria, 
sometimes by means of not very technical criteria in order to find a theoretical 
equity.11 That is why sometimes different legal systems were applied 
cumulatively or the application of a particular legal system was ruled out in an 
unjustified way.  
An attempt is made to overcome the apparent split in the law of succession 
produced by the wording of article 9.8 CC by adding the final words “not 
including the legally reserved portions of the descendants”. Nevertheless, in 
legal literature these final words have been criticized, because they could 
adulterate at times the reach of the succession rights of the widowed spouse, 
specifically when these cover the descendants’ legally reserved portion, but the 
portions are governed by a law of succession which does not allow them to be 
affected.12 In this sense, the final words of article 9.8 CC have been branded as 
excessively inflexible and unconnected with the favor viduitatis. Besides, in legal 
literature it has also been argued that a solution like the one contained in article 
16.2 CC, relating to the widowhood right regulated in the Compilation of 
Aragón, would have been more suitable.13 This right resorts to the 
compensation of succession rights14 in order to avoid an excessive benefit or 
damage for the widowed spouse.  
3.1.2. Conflictive interpretations and the characterization dilemma 
Although the aforementioned rule apparently clarifies the situation of how to 
regulate succession rights of the widowed spouse, there have been certain 
decisions by the General Directorate of Registers and Notaries (from now on, 
DGRN), an administrative body in the Spanish Ministry of Justice, which have 
held that when referring to the succession rights of the widow or widower not 
                                                 
10  N. BOUZA VIDAL, Problemas de adaptación en Derecho internacional privado e interregional, 
 Tecnos, Madrid, 1977, p. 92.  
11  A. L. CALVO CARAVACA/J. CARRASCOSA GONZÁLEZ/E. CASTELLANOS RUÍZ, 
 Derecho de familia internacional, Colex, Madrid, 2005, p. 307.  
12  M. E. ZABALO ESCUDERO, La situación jurídica del cónyuge viudo: Estudio en el Derecho 
 internacional privado y Derecho interregional, Aranzadi, Pamplona, 1993, p. 212.  
13  A. BORRÁS RODRÍGUEZ, No discriminación por razón de sexo: Derecho internacional 
 privado español, Anuario de Derecho Civil, 1991, p. 242. 
Article 16.2 CC specifically  determines that: “The widowhood right regulated in the 
 Compilation of Aragon corresponds to spouses who come under the matrimonial 
 property regime of this Compilation, even if their civil law status has changed later, 
 excluding in that case the legally reserved portion established by the law of succession. 
(…)” and, in its  last section: “The widow’s usufruct also corresponds to the widowed 
spouse when the dead spouse had Aragonese civil law status at the moment of death”. 
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all succession rights are meant.15 From this perspective, only certain personal 
rights, such as the year of mourning, the domestic trosseau and some 
advantages under local law follow the law applicable to matrimonial property. 
In both cases it was intended to designate the applicable law to the succession 
rights of a widow within the framework of an intestate succession in 
Interregional Law in which the decedent had Catalan civil law status but the 
spouses’ joint earnings were governed by Spanish Civil Law. Both resolutions 
of the DGRN were clearly shaped in favour of applying Catalan Civil Law as lex 
successionis to determine the succession rights of the surviving spouse instead of 
Spanish Civil Law, which governed matrimonial property. This was the 
confirmation of the notaries´ opinion against the one of the registrars, who 
refused to register the deeds of acceptance and partition of inheritance, and 
sought a more favourable regime for the widow or widower.  
This solution pleases the Civil law academics more than the PIL academics, 
given that the former consider that these decisions of the DGRN fit better with 
the principle of favor viduitatis and the preferential application of the 
autonomous regional legal systems before the Civil Code.16  
In the context of Spanish Interregional Law, it is frequent that a court has to 
examine a case which covers aspects depending on different legal systems. At 
that point, the court will face characterization problems and it will have to 
decide if it is necessary to opt for a lex fori characterization, or more precissely a 
lex judicii characterization, or for a characterization of the law governing the 
merits of the case or lex civilis litis characterization.17 In the opinion of the 
authors who support the last kind of characterization, only this makes possible 
uniformity of decisions, because its results would not depend on the diverging 
characterization of each competent court,18 but on the characterization carried 
out by the lex civilis litis, which would be the same irrespective of the competent 
court applying the conflict of laws rule. In both cases resolved by the DGRN, 
intestate successions governed by the Catalan Law of Succession were 
analyzed, and the conclusion was reached by means of a lex causae or more 
                                                 
15  Resolution of the DGRN of 11 March 2003 (BOE num. 100 of 26 April 2003) and 
Resolution of the DGRN of 18 June of 2003 (BOE num. 181 of 30 July 2003). 
16 E. CORRAL GARCÍA, Los derechos sucesorios del cónyuge viudo en el Derecho civil común y 
 autonómico, Bosch, Barcelona, 2007, p. 240.  
17  Terminology proposed in Spanish legal literature in the field of Spanish Interregional 
Law by A. BORRÁS RODRÍGUEZ, Calificación, reenvío y orden público en el Derecho 
interregional español, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma de 
Barcelona, Bellaterra, 1984, p. 34. Also arguing for a lex civilis litis characterization in   
this context, A. BORRÁS RODRÍGUEZ, “Los conflictos internos en materia civil a la luz 
de la legislación actualmente vigente” in Conflictos de leyes en el desarrollo del Derecho civil 
vasco, Real Sociedad Bascongada de Amigos del País (Comisión de Bizkaia), Bilbao, 
1999, p. 80.    
18  A. BORRÁS RODRÍGUEZ, Calificación, reenvío y orden público en el Derecho 
 interregional español, Servicio de Publicaciones de la Universidad Autónoma de 
 Barcelona, Bellaterra, 1984, p. 33. 
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precissely a lex civilis litis characterization, which allowed the obtention of the 
widow’s usufruct over the whole inheritance. It is a mortis causa right shaped 
from the perspective of the Catalan Civil Law.  
Other authors point out notwithstanding that the problem of accepting this 
kind of lex civilis litis characterization in cases of Interregional Law is that it 
could protect the case-by-case nature of the decisions,19 given that they will 
depend on what is established in each Spanish legal system, a fact which could 
go against the aim of article 9.8 CC of avoiding this characterization problem. In 
this sense, these authors do not argue for a lex judicii characterization, but for a 
characterization according to the system of Interregional Law, i.e. based on the 
conception contained in its rules.20 This sector of legal literature believes that 
the characterization procedure has to be closely connected with the 
interpretation and the delimitation of the conflict of laws rules, without 
separating the characterization from the rules of the Interregional Law system.21 
In this case, it would be necessary to characterize what is established in article 
9.8 CC, the obvious purpose of which is to get past these difficulties by means 
of the remission to article 9.2 CC. Whatever the case may be, the observation 
indicating that the competent court should choose a matrimonial or a 
successory characterization according to what is more favourable for the 
surviving spouse22 could also be appropriate, although the more favourable law 
should also be the limit of the obtainable rights. 
On the other hand, although the scope of the rights referred to by article 9.8 CC 
has been debated for a long time, it has been generally admitted that it includes 
all the rights which are attributed by law to the widowed spouse when he or 
she has not been designated as inheritor by his or her spouse, in order to 
guarantee the continuity of the standard of living enjoyed until the decedent’s 
death.23 Consequently, these rights would not be only personal rights. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile paying attention to the criticism underlined in 
the legal literature regarding the formulation of article 9.8 CC remitting to 
article 9.2 CC.24 When article 9.2 CC refers to the effects of the marriage, it has 
                                                 
19  A. FONT I SEGURA, Comentario a la Resolución DGRN de 18 de junio de 2003, Revista 
 Española de Derecho Internacional, 2003, pp. 994 f.  
20  A. FONT I SEGURA, Comentario a la Resolución DGRN de 18 de junio de 2003, Revista 
 Española de Derecho Internacional, 2003, p. 995.  
21 S. ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, Derecho interregional: claves para una reforma,  Anuario 
Español de Derecho Internacional Privado, 2003, p. 52.  
 In the same sense, S. ÁLVAREZ  GONZÁLEZ, Estudios de Derecho interregional, Servizo 
de Publicacións da Universidade de Santiago de Compostela, 2007, p. 102.  
22  F. BOULANGER, Droit international des successions, Economica, 2004, p. 142.  
23  M. E. GINEBRA MOLINS, Els conflictes de lleis derivats de la coexistència de diversos 
 ordenaments jurídics civils a l’Estat Espanyol, La Notaría 4, 1996, on web edition. 
24  S. ÁLVAREZ GONZÁLEZ, “Dos cuestiones de actualidad en el reciente Derecho 
 internacional privado” in Estudios de Derecho civil: Homenaje al Profesor Francisco  Javier 
 Serrano García, Secretariado de Publicaciones e Intercambio Editorial de la 
 Universidad de Valladolid, Valladolid, 2005, p. 142. 
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to be recalled that article 9.3 CC is the rule which specifically refers to the 
matrimonial property regime agreements, and this article 9.3 CC remits to 
article 9.2 CC as a first possible connexion point of the conflict of laws rule. 
Consequently, if the spouses opt for a matrimonial property regime which 
differs from the one contemplated by the applicable law for the effects of the 
marriage under article 9.2 CC, the aim of article 9.8 CC will absolutely fail: the 
clash between the rights granted to the widowed spouse by the lex successionis 
and the law applicable to the effects of the marriage will appear again. It has 
been proposed, to avoid this inconvenience, to adopt an interpretation 
determining that the law applicable to the effects of the marriage has to be 
understood as the law which is governing effectively the matrimonial property 
regime.  
In both decisions analyzed of the DGRN, application of the remission of article 
9.8 CC to article 9.2 CC was avoided, justifying this decision as a harmonizing 
interpretation of both articles in order to preserve the unity of the succession 
contained in Spanish Succesion Law, which could be theoretically threatened if 
various aspects of the succession depend on different laws. Nevertheless, the 
aforementioned reason does not seem to be enough to reject the exceptional 
fragmentation of the succession against the principles of unity and universality 
of the succession upheld in the Spanish PIL, as is admitted by article 9.8 CC, in 
order to avoid adaptation problems.25 However, the DGRN has kept defending 
the aforementioned point of view of the analyzed decisions in other recent 
decisions.26 
3.2. THE GERMAN ANSWER TO THESE COORDINATION DIFFICULTIES 
The aforementioned problem of an unequal sharing of the estate may also take 
place in German PIL through application of article 15 EGBGB concerning law 
applicable to matrimonial property and article 25 regarding law of succession. 
The goal is that the widow or widower does not obtain less than what they 
would obtain if only one legal system were applicable. German PIL tries to 
resolve the possible incompatibility between statutes through the mechanism of 
adaptation (Angleichung or Anpassung), which however entails legal insecurity 
and possible unjust results. 
The characterization dilemma also appears in German PIL. § 1371.1 BGB 
assigns the surviving spouse, in cases where the spouses lived under the 
                                                 
25  J. C. FERNÁNDEZ ROZAS/S. SÁNCHEZ LORENZO, Derecho internacional privado, 
 Thomson– Civitas, 3rd ed., Madrid, 2004, p. 432.  
26  RDGRN of 5 February 2005 (BOE num. 82 of 6 April 2005): “This article (9.8 CC) leads 
 to the decedent’s national law at the moment of death, including in its applicational 
 field, as has been established by this Directorate, the succession rights of the 
 surviving spouse.” 
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German statutory marital property regime of deferred community 
(Zugewinngemeinschaft), an automatic increasing of his or her statutory share of 
one quarter of the estate. A doubt arises concerning the characterization of the 
increase as successory or as a matter of the matrimonial property regime..27 If 
we opt for a successory characterization, it is doubtful if it is possible to grant 
this right when the succession is governed by a foreign legal system. The same 
problem arises with a characterization as a question of the matrimonial 
property regime when the law applicable to the matrimonial property regime is 
a foreign law.  
 
According to the theory of double characterization (it is called double because it 
means a simultaneous characterization as successory and as a matter of the 
matrimonial property regime), it is not possible to grant this right in such 
international cases, because the rule only operates if both succession and 
matrimonial property regime follow German law, to prevent adaptation 
problems.28 Nonetheless, according to both the majority of the legal literature 
and the case law, § 1371.1 BGB may apply as well if the succession follows a 
foreign legal system, appealing to the mechanisms of Angleichung or Anpassung. 
This will not be possible if the matrimonial property regime is governed by a 
foreign law, given that § 1371.1 BGB is originally a German material rule only 
applicable if German Law governs the matrimonial propery regime.29 This 
perspective agrees with a characterization as a matter of the matrimonial 
property regime.  
 
During the process of reform of German PIL, the Spanish solution was taken 
under consideration but finally rejected. One of the reasons was that the law 
applicable to testamentary dispositions would be pending at the time of 
drawing up one’s will,30 since the matrimonial property regime can change 
until the death of one of the spouses. It would make no sense for the succession 
of the surviving spouse to follow a matrimonial property regime which was 
changed after the will was drawn up.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
27  M. E. VÖLKL, “Kommentar zu Art. 25 EGBGB” in Deutsche Gesellschaft für 
 Erbrechtskunde (ed), Deutscher Erbrechtskommentar, Carl Heymanns Verlag KG, 
 Köln/Berlin/München, 2003, p. 1477. 
28  P. MANKOWSKI, “Kommentar zu § 1371.1 BGB” in J. von Staudingers Kommentar 
 zum Bürgerlichen Gesetzbuch mit Einführungsgesetz und Nebengesetzen, Sellier-de Gruyter, 
 Berlin, 2003, Rn. 343 f.  
29  K. SIEHR, “Kommentar zu § 1371 BGB, Güterstand” in Rebmann/Kurt and Säcker/ 
 Franz Jürgen and Rixecker/Roland (ed), Münchener Kommentar zum Bürgerlichen 
 Gesetzbuch, Band 10, C.H. Beck, München, 2006, Art. 15, Rn. 114 ff. 
30  Article 26 EGBGB (on the form of testamentary dispositions) applies to article 25 EGBG 
 concerning the content of the will: “(5) Notwithstanding the foregoing provisions the 
 validity of the testamentary disposition and the binding effect of such a diposition 
 underlies the law applicable to successions. (…)” 
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3.3. PROPOSALS MADE TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM 
 
It has been proposed to admit professio iuris to determine the lex hereditatis, just 
as was provided by article 5 of the “Hague Convention of 1 August 1989 on the 
Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of Deceased Persons”. This would 
enable a testator to choose the law of a state as the applicable law, whenever 
this person holds the nationality of that state or has her or his habitual residence 
in it at the moment of the choice or at the moment of death. With this possibility 
of election, it would be easier to coordinate the law applicable to the 
matrimonial property regime and the law applicable to succession,31 avoiding 
the necessity of later adjustments.  
 
However, there are also critical voices against the admission of the possibility of 
election of the applicable law by the de cujus.32 In this sense, it is maintained that 
the essential difference between the possibility of election of the applicable law 
in the matrimonial property regime field and in the succession field consists of 
the fact that in the former the spouses dispose solely in relation to the interests 
of them both. On the contrary, the election of the applicable law by the decedent 
can affect other people who have an interest in the inheritance.  
 
Notwithstanding, more recent opinions in legal literature33 point out rightly 
that it would be enough to protect the potential inheritors who could be 
harmed to formulate a rule similar to article 24 1 d) of the  “Hague Convention 
of 1 August 1989 on the Law Applicable to Succession to the Estates of 
Deceased Persons”, which establishes: “Any State may, at the time of signature, 
ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, make any of the following 
reservations – (…) 
 
that it will not recognize a designation made under Article 5, if all of the following 
conditions are met – (…) 
 
– the application of the law designated under Article 5 would totally or very 
substantially deprive the spouse or a child of the deceased of an inheritance or family 
provision to which the spouse or child would have been entitled under the mandatory 
rules of the law of the State making this reservation,” (…) 
 
Without entering on further discussions on the convenience of admitting the 
professio iuris in the field of international succession, the criticism does not seem 
to be a sufficiently well-founded reason against the election, at least, of the law 
                                                 
31  M. REVILLARD, Note à la decisión de la Cour d’appel de Versailles, première 
 chambre, 20 décembre 1990, JDI (Clunet)  1, 1992, p. 113.   
32  M. GORÉ, “<<De la mode…>> dans les successions internationales: contre les 
 prétensions de la professio iuris” in L’internationalisation du droit, Mélanges en 
 l’honneur de Yvon Loussouarn, Dalloz, Paris, 1994, p. 196.  
33  E. VASSILAKAKIS, “La professio iuris dans les successions internationales” in Le droit 
 international privé: esprit et méthodes, Dalloz, Paris, 2005, p. 814.  
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applicable to the succession rights of the widowed spouse, because there are 
sure ways to protect the interests of other potential inheritors.  
 
In fact, Finnish PIL already admits at present that when a married person draws 
up a will, she or he can establish that the succession rights of his or her spouse 
are governed by the law applicable to matrimonial property. According to 
Chapter 26 Section 6 of the Finnish Code of Inheritance the deceased may 
designate the law applicable to inheritance with some limitations. Paragraph 3 
of Chapter 26 establishes: “Moreover, if the decedent is married at the time of 
the designation, it may be provided that the applicable law is the law of the 
state applicable to matrimonial property matters.” However, this solution does 
not guarantee coordination, because it depends on good legal advice in each 
specific case.  
 
In this sense, German legal literature has been emphasising for a long time that 
the formulation of a clause of election avoiding friction problems between 
matrimonial property regime and law of succession could be shaped skirting 
easily the aforementioned difficulties.34 It would mean choosing the law 
applicable to the matrimonial property regime of the couple by using the same 
law which will govern the succession of the decedent. The election would have 
retrospective effects to the day before the day of the death of the spouse, and 
the settlement of the matrimonial property regime would be governed by the 
new matrimonial property regime, avoiding the well-known adjustment 
problems.  
 
4.  THE SITUATION IN CASES OF NON-MARRIED COUPLES: A QUICK 
 LOOK AT EUROPE 
 
Only Spain, Belgium, South Africa, the Netherlands, Canada and the state of 
Massachussetts in the USA recognize same-sex marriage. In these systems, the 
widowed spouse enjoys the same succession rights regardless of whether the 
marriage is same or different sex. In case marriage is not available to same-sex 
couples, some legal systems establish civil partnerships which may or may not 
grant succession rights to the surviving partner. Consequently, the protection 
level for the surviving partner can be very limited, which different States have 
tried to avoid by adopting regulations more and more assimilated to the ones 
governing married couples.  
 
For PIL the main problem is that succession rights of a same-sex spouse, a 
registered partner or a cohabitee are not universally known. This fact entails 
important problems of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  
 
                                                 
34  P. MANKOWSKI/W. OSTHAUS, Gestaltungsmöglichkeiten durch Rechtswahl beim 
 Erbrecht des überlebenden Ehegatten in internationalen Fällen, Deutsches Notar-Zeitschrift 1, 
 1997, pp. 26 f.  
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In Germany, with the coming into force of the Law of civil partnerships 
(Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz) for same-sex couples, a new PIL rule was adopted 
with article 17b EGBGB. Civil partnerships are governed by the law of the state 
of registry. The succession rights of the surviving partner are however 
determined by the general rule applicable to succession according to the 
national law of the deceased in article 25 EGBGB. With this remission it is 
intended to preserve the interests of third parties who could demand 
inheritance rights.35 The conflict with the widowed spouse's interests appears 
again. However, article 17b EGBGB provides that if the surviving partner does 
not obtain succession rights through the connecting factor of article 25 EGBGB, 
the law of the place of registry will apply. It is a remission to the material rules 
(a so-called Sachnormverweisung), which tries to avoid subsequent renvois. It has 
to be emphasized that the resort to the law of the place of registry only operates 
when the law applicable to succession does not recognize succession rights for 
civil partnerships in general or when it does not provide them in the particular 
case.36 At this point, it is not clear what could be the extent of the obtainable 
rights for the surviving partner. It willl be necessary to resort, for the time 
being, to the aforementioned mechanisms of Angleichung or Anpassung in order 
to look for a reasonable balance of interests.  
 
German legal literature has also considered the difficulties which can arise from 
cases in which a German couple dissolve their union abroad by means of a 
private act or a marriage, without any judgment. In these cases preliminary 
questions may arise, which concern how to deal with the coexistence of claims 
for succession rights of both the widowed spouse and the partner, if the 
subsistence of the partnership created in Germany is admitted. Should only the 
widowed spouse or only the partner inherit? It is not clear whether these 
preliminary questions have to be solved by means of the lex causae or the lex fori.  
 
On the other hand, it is doubtful if an unmarried couple registered in a foreign 
country could be governed by the material rules of the German 
Lebenspartnerschaftsgesetz in order to determine the succession rights of the 
partner. In principle, this would depend on the possibility of replacing the 
concept of the foreign couple with the German one with the same value. This 
substitution would be problematic if the foreign law does not provide for 
succession rights for the partner.37  
 
As another example of legal provisions in these cases, the PIL system in 
Belgium also provides that if the surviving partner does not obtain succession 
rights through the law applicable to non-marital registered partnerships, the lex 
                                                 
35  R. WAGNER, Das neue Internationale Privat- und Verfahrensrecht zur eingetragenen 
 Lebenspartnerschaft, IPRax 2001, p. 291. 
36  M. FORKERT, Eingetragene Lebenspartnerschaften im deutschen IPR: Art. 17b EGBGB, 
 Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, 2003, p. 230. 
37  D. HENRICH, Kollisionsrechtliche Fragen der eingetragenen Lebenspartnerschaft, 
 FamRZ 3, 2002, p. 143. 
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loci registrationis should be applied.38  On the other hand, the Netherlands has 
chosen another way to avoid these possible imbalances when such cases arise, 
which involve the concurrence of various legal systems. Instead of applying PIL 
rules, the Dutch authorities aim to provide good legal advice to couples who 
intend to register, in order to convince them of the advantadges of drawing up 
a will. This written will would certainly prevent problems by determining the 
applicable law. France, on the other hand, does not have PIL rules to define the 
succession rights of registered partners, and there are different possibilities 
which the judge has to examine in different ways.39  This way, the solution will 
not be the same when the lex successionis does not recognize succession rights 
for the surviving partner but the law of the register does or the other way 
around, or when the lex successionis recognizes these succession rights but the 
lex fori does not. Faced with each specific situation, the French competent judge 
will have to appeal to different resolution techniques, from adaptation 
mechanisms of the material laws present to the replacement of foreign legal 
concepts in order to check if they are assimilable to the French ones.   
 
In Sweden, the Registered Partnership Act, which regulates same-sex couples as 
well as different-sex ones, in its Preamble assigns to the Swedish judge the 
function of applying any foreign rules providing succession rights to maintain 
the surviving partner if foreign Succession Law is applicable when the decedent 
dies and it does not provide for these succession rights.40 It has to be recalled 
that the Swedish Registered Partnership Act was enacted in 1995, when the 
Scandinavian countries were pioneers in legislating in the field of civil 
partnerships. Since then, new forms of coexistence, like cohabitation, have 
appeared, which would not fit the Swedish solutions for models similar to 
married couples.41  
 
Denmark was the first country in the world to regulate civil unions in 1989 by 
introducing a law on registered partnership for persons of the same sex, also 
called the Registered Partnership Act. Apart from a few exceptions, the 
conditions are precisely the same as for heterosexual marriages, so this would 
include succession rights of surviving partners. Nevertheless, no PIL rules are 
provided in this act, so international cases like the ones we have analyzed 
would not receive a uniform treatment by the Danish legal system.  
 
In Spain there are different partnership laws in different Autonomous Regions. 
The Catalan statute on unmarried couples, which came into force in 1998, 
grants succession rights to homosexual couples, but not to heterosexual ones. 
From a PIL perspective, specific rules are lacking. In legal literature, the 
                                                 
38  Art. 60 (3), second sentence, Belgian Code of Private International Law. 
39  G. KESSLER, Les partenariats enregistrés en droit international privé, Librairie Générale de 
 Droit et de Jurisprudence, Paris, 2004, p. 347. 
40  M. BODGAN, IPR–Aspekte der schwedischen Eingetragenen Partnerschaft für 
 Homosexuelle, IPRax  1995, p. 57.  
41  C. GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, Parejas de hecho y matrimonios del mismo sexo en la Unión 
 Europea, Marcial Pons, Barcelona, 2004, p. 181.  
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German solution has been favoured. In this sense, a flexible interpretation of 
article 9.8 CC has been suggested.42 It would make it possible to consider that 
the effects of the registered partnership (instead of the “effects of the marriage” 
mentioned in article 9.8 CC) have to be governed by the law of the register, 
which would also determine the succession rights of the surviving partner. In 
this way, the succession rights of the surviving partner would be clearly set, 
entailing the same treatment as that given to the widowed spouse.    
 
It has to be underlined that in the aforementioned European process for the 
adoption of a European instrument relating to successions, account has been 
taken of the possibility of having to resolve as a preliminary question the 
validity not only of a marriage but also of a non-marital registered 
partnership.43 It should be determined what has to be the law appicable to these 
incidental questions.  
  
In general, from a PIL perspective, we can state the difficulty of classifying a 
non-marital registered partnership when, as is frequently the case, there is no 
available specific conflict of laws rule for this purpose. This generates an 
obvious legal uncertainty. Some authors opt for considering these couples as 
personal relationships, which justifies giving them the same treatment as 
married ones. Other authors in legal literature think they are patrimonial 
relationships to be placed in Obligations Law in PIL. However, specialized 
treatments of this complex subject recommend conferring a special dimension 
on these couples by combining personal and patrimonial elements.44 This way, 
when nowadays specific rules in this field are lacking, although having them is 
always the best solution and the aim we should aspire to, it will be necessary to 
combine different PIL techniques to solve each particular case. Sometimes, the 
law of the country with which the case is most closely connected shall be 
applied, other times an analogical application of conflict of laws rules could be 
necessary and, ultimately, an adaptation in the field of what is stipulated by the 
material rules could be suitable. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Adjustment problems between succession and matrimonial property when 
dealing with succession rights of widowed spouses should be dealt with in the 
future European instrument, which intends to unify the law applicable to 
succession. Despite the widespread acceptance of the proposal of including the 
professio iuris in order to allow choice of the law governing matrimonial 
property as the law applicable to the succession rights of the surviving spouse 
                                                 
42 C. GONZÁLEZ BEILFUSS, Parejas de hecho y matrimonios del mismo sexo en la Unión 
 Europea, Marcial Pons, Barcelona, 2004, p. 185.  
43  I. CURRY-SUMNER, All's well that ends registered? The Substantive and Private 
 International Law Aspects of Non-Marital Registered Relationships in Europe, 
 Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford, 2005, p. 493. 
44  O. VAN CAILLIE, La protection du partenaire survivant dans le cadre des lois 
 européennes sur la cohabitation non-maritale, Schulthess, Geneva, 2005, p. 190.  
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or partner, this does not solve the problems which arise in the majority of cases 
when parties are unaware of this kind of difficulty and do not foresee this 
necessity of election.  
 
A conflict of laws rule similar to the one contained in article 9.8 of the Spanish 
Civil Code (CC), which would directly point to the law applicable to this field, 
could manage to avoid the analyzed problems. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
the formulation of article 9.8 CC is neither the object of unanimous 
interpretation, nor a flawless solution. That is why a better formulation of such 
a rule would be desirable. In this sense a clear determination of what specific 
law is expected to govern the succession rights of the widowed spouse would 
be necessary, without allowing any misunderstandings and subsequent 
adjustments, which always run the risk of being arbitrary. 
 
Regarding the situation of the surviving non-married partner, we have to take 
into account that the regulation of non-marital coexistence forms has just begun 
to be developed in most EU countries. Consequently, the determination of the 
succession rights of the surviving partner has to overcome extra difficulties 
compared to the widowed spouse, because of the lack of universal 
acknowledgment of their existence.  
 
It would be suitable to include the legitimate expectations of the surviving non-
married partner in the aforementioned rule of the future European instrument, 
providing a particular clause for all those States which do not admit for the time 
being the legal existence of alternative models of families beyond the traditional 
forms. The reason for this admission of exceptions is that an instrument on 
Succession Law is not the appropriate setting to impel the evident necessity of 
regulating new relationship forms, a challenge which other EU projects should 
overcome successfully.  
 
At least, it deserves further consideration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
